Aristotle on Virtue

With the last few weeks of headlines alleging abuse, lies, and cover-ups, a healthy dose of goodness and virtue is needed.

The doctor from whom this prescription can be obtained is none other than the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, who (along with Plato) is considered to be one of the founding fathers of virtue ethics. His text Nicomachean Ethics studies virtue in general as well as expounding upon particular virtues.

What is Virtue?

In the second book of NE, Aristotle states that virtue is, "the habit or trained faculty that makes a man good and makes him perform his function well."

This definition may raise more questions, such as: 1) what is a trained faculty? 2) what makes a man good? 3) and what is his function?

1) Habits or trained faculties are qualities of the soul, "in respect of which we are well or ill regulated or disposed in the manner of our affections." For example, if Thomas is ill-regulated in regards to the affection of anger, then he could become too violent (excess anger) or perhaps too docile (deficient anger).

2) Man's good is in obtaining his final end, happiness. For his happiness is, "the most desirable thing in the world...something final and self-sufficing, and is the end of all that man does." Now, happiness here is not strictly some subjective psychological state, but rather the proper and excellent exercise of the vital faculties of man. These vital faculties are rooted in the nature of man. For example, Thomas's happiness from the use of the digestive faculty is via food, and not poison. Much more to be said on this in future posts.

3) Man shares functions such as nutrition and growth with plants and sense with animals. To Aristotle, a distinguishing feature of man from the cattle is the rational nature of man. The function of man, then, is to exercise his faculties with and in obedience to reason. Again, "Man's function then being, as we say, a kind of life-that is to say, exercise of his faculties and action of various kinds with reason-the good man's function is to do this well and nobly."

In short (and with less technical jargon) a virtue is a habitual disposition to do good.

What are some Virtues?

From NE, virtues include: courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, high-mindedness, gentleness, agreeableness, truthfulness, wittiness, justice, prudence, and wisdom.

In contrast, a classic Christian list of the virtues includes prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude, faith, hope, and charity.

Hopefully some of these sound familiar to you.

How can I be Virtuous?

A single act of courage or charity does not make a virtuous Thomas. He must foster and develop virtue, such that courage and charity is a deliberate and habitual way of life. Aristotle says this:

A man may do something grammatical by chance, or at the prompting of another person: he will not be grammatical till he not only does something grammatical, but also does it grammatically i.e., in virtue of his own knowledge of grammar... In the case of the virtues, a man is not said to act justly or temperately if what he does merely be of a certain sort- he must also be in a certain state of mind when he does it; first of all, he must know what he is doing; secondly he must choose it, and choose it for itself; and, thirdly his act must be the expression of a formed and stable character.

At every opportunity, tell the truth to your co-workers, friends, and family. Drink and eat in moderation for months on end. Aim for justice, give others what they are due. This is Dr. Aristotle's prescription to these messed up times. 

Short Reflection on the Irish Referendum

As the vote to repeal Ireland's constitutional ban on abortion comes to an end, a short reflection on right, wrong, and democracy is in order.

These posts capture what commonly trends across social media during any election or vote. That is, the celebration of the "will of the people" or "democracy in action." The premise appears to be that the will of the people or democracy in of itself is a good thing. This premise should be critically examined as well as a cause for concern, since not much thought is needed to recall when large groups of people willed tremendously evil things: chattel slavery in the southern states of America, Nazi Germany, twentieth century communism, etc. Numerous examples exist.

Then the important criteria that determines whether the "will of the people" is right or wrong, good or evil, is actually the object that is willed and not the amount of people that will it. The object being that outcome or end which is willed or aimed at by the group. This distinction allows for us to legitimately recognize historical cases where the minority were right or good, such as Socrates in his trial or the abolitionist movement in America. 

What does all of this have to do with the Irish referendum then?

First, no democratic vote answers the question of whether the object of legal abortion is good or evil. That is a question that can only be answered via a combination of philosophy, science, and logic.

Second, when the object of legal abortion is critically examined with the aforementioned methods it becomes abundantly clear that the Irish vote is a paradigmatic case of a large group of people willing a grave evil.

Plain Vanilla Ethics at MercatorNet

At MercatorNet, I critique Dr. Linda Harris's essay on conscience in healthcare. Topics covered include moral ambiguity, conscience formation, and "ethical tension."

For those interested in an alternative solution to the problem of controversial care and conscience protection in a liberal society, I would suggest Professor David Oderberg’s article, “Should There Be Freedom of Dissociation?” There Prof. Oderberg describes the freedoms of association and dissociation and defends dissociation as a reasonable solution to the growing pressures against conscience. Perhaps Dr. Harris would view dissociation as divisive too. This would be an error, as the dissociation solution is trying to solve already pre-existing division in ethical worldviews that arise in liberal societies.

Socrates on Unrighteousness

“Neither in war nor yet at law ought any man to use every way of escaping death. For often in battle there is no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding death, but in avoiding unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death.” - Socrates, Apology

Dr. Michael Gorman on Moral Relativism

The Thomistic Institute has yet again produced another great lecture, this one by Dr. Michael Gorman on the topic of moral relativism. The talk is titled, "True for Me, but Not for You? Moral Relativism and Public Life." Listen to it here.

Dr. Gorman raises two good points about relativism. The first is that total relativism, the claim that all truth is relative to each person, is unworkable. As discussed in a previous post, total relativism is incoherent when applied to itself. Total relativism undermines objective truth claims while simultaneously making an objective truth claim.

The second point is about the illegitimate use of partial relativism. Partial relativism is a more modest claim. It states that only some truths are relative to each person, such as the truths of morality, whereas the truths of science are not. Unlike total relativism, partial relativism, does not (seemingly) undermine itself. 

However, as Dr. Gorman rightly demonstrates, those that shout "All morality is relative!" in order to prevent the stoning of an adulterer, do not have a leg to stand on. Who are you to say that stoning an adulterer is wrong after all?

Is this self refuting?

"The only reality is material reality."

How about:

"The only reality is that reality which is perceived via the senses."

Plain Vanilla Ethics in the NCBQ (Updated)

Besides plain vanilla ethics, one of my main research interests includes medical and life science ethics. Thus, I was happy to be invited to submit a colloquy to the National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, which was published in their Winter 2017 issue. Link here.

In the short essay I offer some critiques to an article written by Marissa Mullins on the topic of when cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) becomes harmful and unethical. My primary concern is that an erroneous definition of when a treatment is deemed “clinically ineffective” has resulted in a focus on empirical data that are just not pertinent to the discussion. Futility of a treatment is properly understood as when said treatment cannot fulfill its intended function or end. It is not when a certain level of quality of life can be achieved.

Links to other published plain vanilla essays:

Moving the goalposts in human embryo research.

Against covert moral bioenhancement.

Updated:
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I have learned that the links above require a login.

Follow this link to the National Catholic Bioethics Center and click "View The Archives."
 




 

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